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FEATURE COMMENT: European
Commission Proposes Expanding The
European Defence Fund—A Major
Potential Barrier To Transatlantic Defense
Procurement
The European Commission (EC) has proposed expanding the European Defence Fund, an initiative
to fund defense technology developed in Europe. As
a general matter, only European firms would have
access to the fund for development, and participating European nations would need to commit themselves to purchasing the defense materiel developed
under the fund.
In effect, this could lock U.S. firms out of billions
of euros worth of European defense procurement
over the coming years—despite long-standing reciprocal agreements under which the U.S. and its
European allies agreed to open their defense markets. The fund was announced quietly last year and
now, in the shadow of a trade war launched by the
Trump administration, has evolved into a substantial potential barrier in the transatlantic defense
market, and potentially another brick in a rising
wall of protectionism between the U.S. and Europe.
European Union’s Efforts to Open Procurement Markets—The European Defence Fund
arose against the backdrop of long-standing efforts
by the EU to pressure other nations, including the
U.S., to expand access to their procurement markets. The EU “International Procurement Instrument,” for example, was first proposed in 2012 as a
regulation that would allow European governments
to discriminate against nations which refuse to
cooperate in negotiations on opening procurement
4-204-928-3

© 2018 Thomson Reuters

markets. See “Commission Amended Proposal for
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Access of Third-Party Goods and
Services to the Union’s Internal Market in Public
Procurement and Procedures Supporting Negotiations on Access of Union Goods and Services to the
Public Procurement Markets of Third Countries,”
COM (2016) 34 final (Jan. 1, 2016), available at
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2012/0060(COD)&l=en; Harte,
European Parliamentary Research Service, “Briefing: International Procurement Instrument” (December 2017), available at www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614610/EPRS_
BRI(2017)614610_EN.pdf; Grier, “EU: Penalizing
Closed Procurement Markets” (Feb. 16, 2016),
available at trade.djaghe.com/?tag=internationalprocurement-instrument&paged=2.
Some of the likeliest targets of discrimination
under the proposed regulation would be China
(which has been stuck in limbo for years in its negotiations to accede to the World Trade Organization
Government Procurement Agreement), and the
U.S. (the Europeans are intent on gaining greater
access to U.S. state and local procurement markets).
See generally Grier, “Do Open Markets Decrease
China’s Incentive to Join GPA” (Nov. 2, 2017),
available at trade.djaghe.com/?tag=internationalprocurement-instrument.
The proposed International Procurement
Instrument has shuttled for years between the
European Parliament and committee, and was to
be considered by committee on June 21—like the
European Defence Fund, possibly another step
towards an open fight over procurement between
the EU and the U.S. See generally European Parliament, Legislative Observatory, available at www.
europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.
do?reference=2012/0060(COD)&l=en (procedure
file); Dawar, “The 2016 EU International Procurement Instrument’s Amendments to the 2012 Buy
European Proposal: A Retrospective Assessment
of Its Prospects,” 50 J. World Trade 845 (2016)
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(tracing the European initiative to U.S. protectionist
models), available at sro.sussex.ac.uk/60062/1/K%20
Dawar%20JWT%20submission%202016%20IPI%20
Amended%20Proposal.pdf.
Emergence of the European Defence Fund—
Although the concept for the European Defence Fund
emerged in late 2016, see “EU Proposes Common Defense Fund,” 58 GC ¶ 435(a), President Trump accelerated the initiative when in May 2017 he scolded European leaders for not spending enough on their own
defense, see, e.g., Emmott, “Trump Effect? Europe’s
Defense Spending to Rise Faster in 2017,” Reuters,
June 28, 2017, available at www.reuters.com/article/
us-nato-defence-idUSKBN19J0ZW. Shortly thereafter,
in June 2017, the EU announced specific plans for
the European Defence Fund, see EC, Press Release:
A European Defence Fund: $5.5 Billion Per Year to
Boost Europe’s Defence Capabilities (Brussels, June
7, 2017), an initiative lauded by some for fostering
investment and development in the European defense
sector, see, e.g., Brattberg and Fly, “Two Cheers for
European Defense Cooperation,” Foreign Policy March
9, 2018, available at foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/09/
two-cheers-for-european-defense-cooperation/.
Although last year’s proposal already contemplated a focused effort to nurture the European defense industry, this year’s announcement marked a
broader effort to fund European defense innovations
from within—and to keep non-European firms from
sharing in the fruits of that investment. See EC, Press
Release: EU Budget: Stepping Up the EU’s Role as a
Security and Defence Provider (Strasbourg, June 13,
2018), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP18-4121_en.htm.
In its most recent announcement on June 13,
the European Commission proposed a budget of
€13 billion for 2021–2027 for the European Defence
Fund, see, e.g., EC, Fact Sheet: European Defence
Fund, available at ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/
beta-political/files/budget-may2018-eu-defencefund_en.pdf, substantially more than the funding
initially proposed last year. The new fund will be used
to support innovation and development in defense
across Europe. The EC stressed the fragmentation
and inefficiencies that can cripple the European
defense industry, and the need to foster cooperation
among European firms to encourage a strong, coordinated defense industrial base in Europe. See, e.g.,
EC, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact
Assessment, SWD (2018) 345 (June 13, 2018), avail2
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able at ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/
files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-fund-swd_en.pdf.
The expanded European Defence Fund would be
available only to defense initiatives spanning three
or more European member states, and the fund could
be used only to develop (not purchase) new defense
systems; member states would have to commit in
advance to purchasing the new systems, using the
member states’ own funds. The regulation proposed
to implement the initiative made clear that the proposed fund is as much about industrial policy as it is
about defense: the fund would be used to foster smalland mid-sized companies in the European member
states, with an eye to economic development as well
as defense security. See EC, Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the European Defence Fund, COM (2018)
476 (Brussels, June 13, 2018), available at ec.europa.
eu/commiss ion/sites/beta-political/files/budgetmay2018-eu-defence-fund-regulation_en.pdf. By the
terms of the proposed regulation (discussed further
below), presumptively the European Defence Fund
would be used exclusively to support European firms.
U.S.-EU Trade Disputes and the New Fund—
The European Defence Fund’s expansion did not, of
course, happen in isolation. Although European policymakers were careful to stress that the fund was not
a “reaction” to the Trump administration, see, e.g., Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini (June 13, 2018), available at eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46450/
remarks-hrvp-mogherini-press-conference-europeandefence-fund-european-peace-facility-and_en, these
latest steps were taken against the backdrop of
a gathering trade war and ongoing uncertainties
about the U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, see, e.g., Taylor, “Trump’s Next
Target: NATO,” Politico, June 14, 2018, available at
www.politico.eu/article/will-donald-trump-wrecknato-summit-too-g7/. The Trump administration has
announced that it will impose steep tariffs against
European steel and aluminum, and the EU has said
that it will respond in kind against goods and services
from the U.S. See, e.g., Petroff, “Trump Is Starting
a Global Trade War,” CNN Money (June 1, 2018),
available at money.cnn.com/2018/05/31/investing/
us-steel-aluminum-tariffs-response/index.html.
The European initiative also came in the wake
of the Trump administration’s own efforts to boost
foreign military sales by U.S. firms, see National
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S.
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (April 19, 2018);
“White House Rolls Out Arms Transfer Policy, Drone
Sales Priorities,” 60 GC ¶ 146, and concern among
some U.S. policymakers that President Trump is
squandering the U.S.’ goodwill with its allies.
Will the New Fund Violate Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?—From a U.S.
perspective, the unanswered question is whether
the European Defence Fund will, in fact, be a barrier to U.S. firms in the European defense market.
Though one senior EU policymaker argued that “the
United States understand[s] perfectly well that European money goes to support European projects,”
see Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President
Federica Mogherini, supra, and a number of observers read the new initiative to mean that U.S. firms
will be locked out, see “EU to Block UK, US from €13
Billion ‘European Defence Fund’; Programme Bid to
Guarantee Member States’ Security,” World Agence
France-Presse, June 13, 2018, available at www.
firstpost.com/world/eu-to-block-uk-and-us-from-e13billion-european-defence-fund-programme-a-bid-toguarantee-member-states-security-4508597.html, the
proposed implementing regulation was less than clear
on this important point.
On one hand, the EC’s proposed regulation was
explicitly protectionist. The EC noted that because
the fund “aims at enhancing the competitiveness, efficiency and autonomy of the Union’s defence industry,”
only entities “established in the Union or associated
countries and not subject to control by non-associated
third countries or non-associated third country entities” (such as U.S.-based firms) “should in principle be
eligible for support.” Furthermore, the proposed regulation warned, “in order to ensure the protection of essential security and defence interests” of the EU and
its member states—a phrase that normally signals a
derogation from open-market obligations under trade
agreements—“the infrastructure, facilities, assets
and resources used by the recipients and their subcontractors in actions supported by the Fund should
not be located on the territory of non-associated third
countries.” Taken on their face, these provisions would
seem to mean that no part of the work supported by
the fund could be done in the U.S., or by a U.S.-based
or -controlled contractor or subcontractor.
At the same time, however, the proposed regulation seemed to leave the door open to possible involvement by U.S. firms. “In certain circumstances,”
© 2018 Thomson Reuters
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said the proposed regulation, “if this is necessary for
achieving the objectives of the action, it should be
possible to derogate from the principle that recipients
and their subcontractors should not be subject to control by non-associated third countries or non-associated third country entities.” To involve a non-European
firm, applicants would have to show that “relevant
and strict conditions relating to the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States
are fulfilled,” and the “participation of such entities
should not contravene the objectives of the Fund.” The
proposed regulation did not explain, however, what
the “strict conditions” are; nor did it explain when,
exactly, participation by a non-European firm might
“contravene the objectives of the fund.”
Nor—and critically—did the proposed regulation
squarely address many European states’ standing
obligations to keep their defense markets open to
U.S.-based firms, under the reciprocal defense procurement agreements that the U.S. has entered into
with the majority of its European allies. Of the 28
EU member states and four European Free Trade
Association nations (which also may participate
in the fund, under appropriate circumstances), 21
nations have entered into these reciprocal agreements with the U.S., and so generally have agreed
not to discriminate in their purchases of defense
materiel and services. See Department of Defense,
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition
Policy Memoranda of Understanding, available
at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_
procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html.
The U.S. commitments under the reciprocal agreements are written into the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, see DFARS 226.872,
and those commitments to open DOD purchases to
vendors from “qualifying” (signatory) countries are
a recognized part of U.S defense procurement. See,
e.g., Yukins and Ramish, Feature Comment, “Section
809 And ‘e-Portal’ Proposals, By Cutting Bid Protests
In Federal Procurement, Could Breach International
Agreements And Raise New Risks Of Corruption,” 60
GC ¶ 138 (discussing agreements).
The EC’s proposal does not explain whether the
reciprocal defense procurement agreements with the
U.S. will be honored—and so leaves open the possibility that the European Defence Fund will become a
new battleground in the ongoing trade wars between
the U.S. and Europe.
3
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Potential Impact of a Trade War in the
Transatlantic Defense Market—A trade war in
defense would not be good news for the U.S., for both
economic and security reasons. The U.S. enjoys a
large and long-standing trade surplus with Europe
in defense equipment, see, e.g., “The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for
European Defence Industries” (No. ENTR 08/040) (EC
December 2009), available at ec.europa.eu/growth/
sectors/defence/industrial-policy_en, and U.S. defense
firms could be hurt if a “European preference” took
hold in the EU’s defense markets. See generally Butler, Transatlantic Defence Procurement (Cambridge
U. Press 2017).
The loss to the U.S. would go beyond lost exports.
As a matter of policy, the U.S. has long worked to
open foreign defense markets, on a reciprocal basis,
partly to share the cost burdens of weapons development, but also to foster closer military cooperation
between the U.S. and its allies. See, e.g., Miller, “Is
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It Time To Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement
Agreements?,” 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 93, 96 (2009); Bialos, Fisher and Koehl, “Fortresses and Icebergs: The
Evolution of the Transatlantic Defense Market and
Its Implications for U.S. National Security Policy”
(Brookings 2009). In doing so, DOD has sought to
enhance a common defense with its allies by encouraging interoperability between U.S. and allied defense
systems. If the European Defence Fund ultimately
locks out U.S. defense firms from new European
defense initiatives, although interoperability among
European defense systems may improve, ready interoperability—and a coordinated defense—between
the U.S. and its European allies may well suffer.
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This Feature Comment was written for The Government Contractor by Christopher R. Yukins,
Lynn David Research Professor in Government
Procurement Law, George Washington University Law School.
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